Cyber deterrence isn’t credible
Austin Long, .2018, Austin Long is a Senior Political Scientist at the Rand Corporation. His research interests include low-intensity conflict, intelligence, military operations, nuclear forces, military innovation, and the political economy of national security. Long previously was an Associate Professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. He also was an analyst and adviser to the U.S. military in Iraq (2007–08) and Afghanistan (2011 and 2013). He was a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in Nuclear Security,serving in the Joint Staff J5. Bytes, Bombs, and Spies (p. 423). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.
Reflecting this uncertainty, the variance in the damage inflicted by a cyberattack is likely to be greater than by a kinetic attack.24 In other words, the distribution of damage that would be inflicted by many types of cyberattacks is likely less tightly clustered around the hoped-for or planned damage than the damage from many types of kinetic attacks. Uncertainty about the damage a cyberattack would inflict could make kinetic threats more effective deterrents than cyber threats. The effectiveness of deterrent threats depends on a state’s ability to carry out the threat: deterrence by d