WEDNESDAY , MAY 22 , 2019
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India Security Council Updates

India Security Council Updates

India aggressive in Kashmir now

News Click, 4-20, 19, //www.newsclick.in/whither-kashmir-0 Whither Kashmir? Right before our eyes we are witness to a military suppression in Kashmir, in line with Indian army’s objective to “transform the will and attitude of the people”, and yet it has not stirred the conscience of opinion and policy makers in India. With the Government of India pursuing a no-holds-barred hard-line approach to the seven-decade old conflict over Kashmir, it appears that Bhartiya Janata Party wants to out-perform military suppression of the 1990s. ‘Operation All Out’ being carried out by the Indian armed forces has been combined with oppressive policing methods that involve cordon and search operation, arbitrary detentions, torture in custody, filing of trumped up charges, and banning of Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and JKLF. The ban was imposed without even bothering to comply with law under which the ban was imposed. For instance, it is mandatory under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, to provide the “grounds” or cases/facts or FIRs filed in the immediately preceding year/s against the organisation sought to be proscribed. A judgment of the Supreme Court in JeI versus Union of India, 1994, laid stress on this while dismissing the ban imposed on JeI by the PV Narsimha Rao Government. In Kashmir’s case too, no grounds were provided in the official gazette notification banning the two organisations. Indeed, the authorities could not care less to follow the law. Here, rule by diktat is the operative rule. All this is taking place at a time when one of the most decisive elections in country’s history is taking place to elect the 17th Lok Sabha. What is the consequence of this muscular approach? Thousands have overnight become “criminals” because they are related to someone who is a member of, or is somehow associated with the banned organisations which were otherwise working legitimately for most of thirty years. It’s easy picking now to paint someone as “suspect” and an adversary of India. It is nothing but the Indian State terrorising its own citizens. Even Kashmiri officials are under scrutiny for their links with the banned organisations. And those in authority trivialise the grave threat experienced by Kashmiris and/or express their disdain for Kashmiris. LAWLESS GOVERNMENT When the government does not follow the law that they enforce on people and Constitutional freedoms remain virtually suspended, it makes Kashmir into an area of darkness and lawlessness. Neither does the Rule of Law prevail as in non-conflict areas of the country, nor does Rule of War operate in what has been a “Disturbed Area” for past three decades. It is this that should be a cause of concern because a region said to be “integral part of India” smacks of being ruled as though it is an alien land peopled by “proxy warriors”, rather than fellow citizens who are alienated and desperate for a political resolution. Neither infiltration, which is in double digits only, nor the number of militants (a few hundreds, indigenous and foreign), can justify a huge deployment of army, central para-military forces, J&K armed police backed by former rebels who are now SPOs, to fight militancy. That too in a land area 60 km long and 40 km wide. The increased deployment of 100 companies of CRPF in the past six months, and restrictions imposed on movements of people with more bunkers, checkpoints, camps to house the soldiers, makes Kashmir a highly militarised zone, crowded with security camps. To make this harsh reality more bitter, authorities recently imposed a ban on civilian vehicles on the National Highway on Wednesdays and Sundays, reserving it for military vehicles. This is reminiscent of the British colonial ruler’s habit of imposing collective punishment on people whenever things went out of their control or they feared losing control. This is what is being imposed on Kashmiris by the “nationalist” BJP led Government. Interestingly, banning civilian vehicles is something which was never attempted even at the height of insurgency in 1990s. The Army protested the recent ban saying that they were not consulted and that they will ply their vehicles every day of the week barring Friday. In fact, on Monday April 16th, Army personnel stopped all civilian vehicles and beat up the SDM of Dooru (district Anantnag) near Dalwach Square near Qazigund along with his four colleagues who were travelling in an official car while on election duty. So, between two-day ban by Indian government and local level restrictions on plying of vehicles by the military personnel, Kashmiris are being squeezed from both sides. This affects every routine activity including attending schools, rushing to hospitals, attending work, visiting market, or going for business, etc. It is said that this prohibition will last until May 31, but by then a people already suffering from military suppression would have experienced manifold greater pain. It is worth recalling that more than half of the Kashmiris suffer from PTSD, that armed forces enjoy legal immunity for whatever they do, that justice is denied to civilians who are victims of egregious violations by armed forces, and even Kashmiris in state services are treated with suspicion and they are slowly getting side-lined. It is evident that there is a deliberate policy to ratchet up coercion on ordinary people to force them to give up their demand for “azaadi”. What will this escalation of repression on Kashmiris do to their pent-up anger and resentment when every door has been shut and all possibilities of normal redressal ruled out, is not too difficult to imagine. PITFALLS OF PROLONGED DEPLOYMENT That thirty years after making J&K “Disturbed Area” and extending legal immunity through AFSPA, the armed forces still claim to be fighting a “proxy war” reminds us of when the apex court wondered: does the fact that an area remains “disturbed” for decades on end and normalcy still escapes being restored imply that army has failed to do its job or that the Government has failed to make use of opportunities created by the armed forces? As earlier pointed out, it is when we look at actual numbers we discover the utter futility of the policy of military suppression. By targeting civilians at home in the name of cordon and search operations or targeting civilian protestors at encounter site and funerals, the armed forces may succeed for a while. But to believe that Kashmiris can be silenced now, when the same failed for three decades of “Disturbed Area” and AFSPA is to believe in the unbelievable. Even more alarming is what the Army’s own Doctrine of Sub-conventional Operations pointed out – something they ought to be aware of. It argues that in such operations there is “blurring” of distinction between fighting the ‘enemy’ and ‘fighting his own people’ as well as there is “blurring” of distinction between “front and rear; strategic and tactical; combatants and non-combatants”. In other words an army whose primary duty is to defend the country against external threat in which it requires its ‘rear’ i.e. hinterland to be secure, has been engaged in operations in the hinterland fighting the people for past three decades, thus, compromising on its primary task which requires a secure and friendly ‘rear’. This vulnerability of the Army, India’s primary force to defend our borders, is presented as strengthening “national security”! Indian army is fond of claiming that it wages its operations mindful of protecting civilians. Yet, not only had the Indian Army chief and other potentates come out in support of Major Gogoi for the “human shield” incident, considered a war crime under international humanitarian law, they even described it as an “innovative” method. It appears that the army chief sent a message to his rank and file to do as they will, without a care for the consequence, whereas the message sent to Kashmiris was that every method fair or foul will be used against them unless they surrender. In this situation, for police and administration to carry out repression in the name of curbing unlawful activities of JeI and JKLF members/supporters carries the message that non-violent politics has no future. If to this is added the poison of BJP’s hate-filled rhetoric against Kashmiris the message being driven across is that official India does not care what is done to Kashmiris because either they are proxies for Pakistan or by insisting on “azaadi” they have forfeited the right to their life and liberty. There is no stomach to rigorously examine the role played by successive Indian governments in the making of the crisis in Kashmir and a largely apathetic Indian society, in turning Kashmiris away from India, and for both caring little for sanctity of Kashmiris Muslims life and liberty. WORRYING DEVELOPMENT It is this that should worry Indians. Because Indian government’s policy of military suppression is not driving Kashmiris away from militancy but towards it and that too, to a more virulent form. Officials themselves claim two abortive suicide bombings in past few weeks. In one instance the bomber panicked at the last minute thus averting a major calamity. So, with all doors closed, and the armed forces carrying out ‘Operation All Out’, hatred of ordinary Kashmiris has increased and hostility towards them is openly expressed. All this makes for a incendiary situation. The singular achievement of BJP led government of India in Kashmir in the last five years has been its shrill campaign that everything-is-Pakistan’s-fault when the facts on the ground show that truth is otherwise. It is the utter failure of BJP led government which is evident. Three decades down the line, authorities still profess a muscular approach rather than ask themselves why three decades of military suppression has not “transformed the will and attitude of the people” which is what army’s objective was. So, what is it that makes BJP government feel that they will succeed when wise army veterans have repeatedly warned the Indian public that there is no military solution to Kashmir dispute and what is required is a dialogue between all stakeholders? And when the damage being inflicted will only fortify the resolve of those who are desperate and know all options are closed, how can this dismal state of affair be in “nation’s interest”?

India UNSC membership will boost Modi politically and catapult India to global leadership

Vivek, Katju, 4-20-, 19, //www.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/indias-permanent-membership/ India’s permanent membership Greater Kashmir Both the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress parties election manifestos express a desire to work towards India’s permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The former states, “We are committed to seeking permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council so that the body reflects the contemporary realities of the world. We are determined to intensify our efforts towards these objectives.” The latter notes, “We will re-double the efforts to win permanent membership of the UNSC and the NSG.” The NSG stands for the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The language of these formulations is routine. This is further reinforced, in Congress’s case, by the clubbing together of UNSC and NSG ‘permanent’ membership. This is sloppy drafting for it overlooks the fact that there is no such thing as a ‘permanent’ membership of the NSG as there is in the UNSC where the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China are permanent members. This technicality apart the NSG and the UNSC are not at all comparable; their inclusion in one sentence is therefore also problematic. LATEST NEWS Pulwama youth goes missing, family seek help to trace him Altaf Bukhari grieved over demise of Mian Altaf’s daughter Independence of Judiciary under threat: Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi All laws in Kashmir should be at par with rest of India: Shiv Sena The NSG is a multilateral group which seeks to control trade in civil nuclear materials and technology. Its members set the rules for this trade. India was given an exemption following the Indo-US nuclear deal. This was needed for India is not a member of the Nuclear non-Proliferation treaty. The UNSC is an organ of the United Nations dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security. It has therefore virtually a universal character and its permanent membership would elevate India’s diplomatic status tremendously. Two questions arise. The first relates to the implication of the assertion in the BJP manifesto viz. that the UNSC does not reflect contemporary because of India’s exclusion. The second: can UNSC reform that would lead to India becoming a permanent member be achieved anytime soon? The United Nations was established after the Second World War. It put in place a world order that consolidated the position of the victors of that war—the Allied powers and the Soviet Union. They wanted future matters of global security to be decided among themselves; hence, they not only accorded themselves permanent membership but also gave themselves powers to veto any UNSC decision, thereby ensuring that such decisions could only be taken by a consensus among themselves. China became an unmerited beneficiary for it too became a permanent member just because it had suffered Japanese occupation and a third world country had to be included. At that time, it was subordinate to the Allied powers and would, it was expected, do their bidding. Hence, despite the Communist take-over Taiwan held the UN seat till 1972. The world of 2019 is completely different from that of 1945. The Soviet Union has gone and Russia has taken its seat. Imperial France and Britain have become middle-level powers overshadowed in Europe by Germany. China is claiming the global second slot by virtue of its enormous financial reserves and its military power too. In the present international situation Germany, Japan, India and Brazil claim that they have the heft to become permanent members and have joined hands to press their claims. They are being opposed by a group of countries that feel that their interests would be hurt by the rise in status of the four. Maria Garces, President of the current, the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly said, in January this year, at the re-commencement of work on UNSC reform, “It is now over 25 years since the Open-Ended Working Group was formed. Intergovernmental negotiations began more than a decade ago. And still, the composition of the Security Council continues broadly to reflect the world as it was in 1945, save for the increase in non-permanent seats half a century ago. A lot has changed since then, to put it mildly”. There is no apparent hope that the vast differences in views will be bridged anytime soon. A large part of the membership agrees that the working methods of the UNSC as well as the relationship between it and the UNGA needs to change. However, there is no consensus on “categories of membership, the question of veto and regional representation”. There is also the issue of the size of a future UNSC. There is a general recognition that the current size needs to increase but the permanent members do not want it to become unwieldy. Africa and South America feel that they are inadequately represented in the Council. Significantly, Syed Akbaruddin, India’s excellent Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, recalled last month that 113 countries of the 122 who had formally responded on UNSC reform within the UN system deliberations had supported expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories. Among them there is also wide-spread recognition that India cannot be kept out of permanent membership of an expanded security council for it fulfils all required criterion. This is so in terms of its political and diplomatic importance and its growing economy. It is also a factor of stability in its extended neighbourhood. Most countries voice their support for India becoming a permanent member in bilateral interactions. However, this will have to be tested when the UNSC reform process actually gains traction. India must continue to press its case and along with like-minded countries keep the issue high on the UN agenda. With India joining as a permanent member the UNSC will indeed gain greater legitimacy for it will then reflect contemporary realities more.

India-US relations strong now

Trivedi, 4-17, 19, //warontherocks.com/2019/04/one-year-on-should-india-rethink-its-reset-with-china/, Atman Trivedi is an adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum and managing director at Hills & Company, International Consultants. He previously worked at the U.S. State and Commerce Departments, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ONE YEAR ON, SHOULD INDIA RETHINK ITS RESET WITH CHINA? India and America continue to build defense ties through so-called enabling or foundational agreements, new consultations (such as last fall’s “2+2” summitry normally reserved for U.S. treaty allies), and skyrocketing arms sales. Building on the efforts of its predecessor, the Trump administration describes India as a centerpiece of its Indo-Pacific strategy, irrespective of New Delhi’s relations with Beijing.

China economic aggression biding the US to India

Trivedi, 4-17, 19, //warontherocks.com/2019/04/one-year-on-should-india-rethink-its-reset-with-china/, Atman Trivedi is an adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum and managing director at Hills & Company, International Consultants. He previously worked at the U.S. State and Commerce Departments, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ONE YEAR ON, SHOULD INDIA RETHINK ITS RESET WITH CHINA? If the last few months are any indication, however, the more likely outcome is that China’s policies will serve as a glue that binds India, America, and their democratic allies in Asia and Europe more closely together. Following the Azhar disappointment with China, India announced it will again boycott the high-visibility Belt and Road Forum. This week, the brand-new Indo-Pacific division in India’s foreign office went to work for the first time. Rather than waiting for these partnerships to grow organically, India and its fellow democracies should press down on the accelerator as Asia’s balance of power shifts.

China-Pakistan economic ties increasing

Trivedi, 4-17, 19, //warontherocks.com/2019/04/one-year-on-should-india-rethink-its-reset-with-china/, Atman Trivedi is an adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum and managing director at Hills & Company, International Consultants. He previously worked at the U.S. State and Commerce Departments, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ONE YEAR ON, SHOULD INDIA RETHINK ITS RESET WITH CHINA? But as long as the violence doesn’t affect it, China is reluctant to hold its “all-weather” ally accountable. Since 2005, Beijing has poured nearly $52 billion in investments and contracts into Pakistan (almost double the amount of Chinese investment in India over this period). The pair also launched a new consultation mechanism last month to shore up the economic centerpiece of their collaboration, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

India supports a contrasting economic model to China’s

Trivedi, 4-17, 19, //warontherocks.com/2019/04/one-year-on-should-india-rethink-its-reset-with-china/, Atman Trivedi is an adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum and managing director at Hills & Company, International Consultants. He previously worked at the U.S. State and Commerce Departments, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ONE YEAR ON, SHOULD INDIA RETHINK ITS RESET WITH CHINA? Perhaps most importantly, China continues to overtly exert greater economic influence in South Asia – where India has traditionally sought to maintain a sphere of influence over its smaller neighbors. Chinese pressure continues unabated in Nepal and Bhutan, where Beijing seeks favorable terms to settle its boundary disputes. To be sure, recent political developments in the Maldives and Sri Lanka offer hints that South Asian countries are worried about being crushed by China’s economic embrace. Still, thus far, India, like a number of other democracies (notably excepting Japan), has struggled to offer better choices on infrastructure development and trade. Other than a few trade concessions and perhaps gentler rhetoric, China has not been reciprocating India’s gestures and is in fact continuing to thwart India’s ambitions on the regional and global stages. China’s interests at the border, in the Indian Ocean, related to the Belt and Road Initiative, and with Pakistan simply do not align with India’s. And Beijing is in a better position to act on those interests than ever before. China’s explosive rise over the past four decades has outpaced India’s own impressive growth story, and Beijing is eager to flex the country’s new muscles overseas.

US no longer an honest broker

Trivedi, 4-17, 19, //warontherocks.com/2019/04/one-year-on-should-india-rethink-its-reset-with-china/, Atman Trivedi is an adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum and managing director at Hills & Company, International Consultants. He previously worked at the U.S. State and Commerce Departments, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ONE YEAR ON, SHOULD INDIA RETHINK ITS RESET WITH CHINA? The stark contrast between China’s reaction and that of the world’s democracies to the latest Pakistan-based attack on India should provide clarity in Raisina Hill. Dating back to the 1999 Kargil crisis, Washington has gradually shifted from a “neutral arbiter” in India-Pakistan conflicts to one that stands decisively with the world’s largest democracy and against violent extremism. This shift accelerated after the attacks on Mumbai in 2008, and was recently evident in the Trump administration’s reaction to the Jaish-e-Mohammed attack, after which the United States largely stood shoulder to shoulder with India. National Security Advisor John Bolton backed India’s right to self-defense, while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for mutual restraint – but only after India’s retaliatory strike. He also first demanded that Islamabad take “meaningful action against terrorist groups operating on its soil.” Then, it was Washington, along with the United Kingdom and France, who sponsored a U.N. proposal to list Azhar as a global terrorist. (In 2009 and 2016, India was the one that moved the same measure.) The Quad members, as well as other European and Asian democracies, all stood behind that effort. The United States worked hard behind the scenes to win China’s support. When the bid failed, Washington and its allies pivoted to other U.N. avenues to designate Azhar.

India is no longer a model for democracy

Kanak Mani Dixit, a writer and journalist based in Kathmandu, is the founding editor of the Colombo-based magazine, ‘HimalSouthasian’. Source: The Hindu, 4-18, 19, //www.thekashmirmonitor.net/indian-elections-south-asian-concerns/, Indian elections, South Asian concerns The staggering scale of the election that is under way in India with just under a billion voters is hard for the mind to grapple with, even in this densely populated neighbourhood that includes Bangladesh and Pakistan. The level of worry is also at a pitch, for India should be the bulwark against weakening democracy in a world of Bolsonaro (Brazil), Duterte (the Philippines), Erdogan (Turkey), Putin (Russia) and Trump (the U.S.) not to mention the People’s Republic of China. Modern India, created by M.K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru and their cohort, should be raising the standard for social justice and grass-roots democracy, and against destructive right-wing populism. This has not quite been Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s record, and hence the concern that another five years would redefine the very idea of India. Already, the term ‘world’s largest democracy’ is achieving banality as India gains majoritarian momentum. Centralised control of society would never be possible in such a vast and variegated society of sub-nationalities, we were told, but look at what is happening. The high principle and probity of India’s political class, bureaucracy, academia and civil society are now exceptions rather than the rule. India’s Ambassadors are no longer the self-confident professionals we knew for decades, they act today like timid note-takers. Higher education is directed by those who insist that the achievements of Vedic era science included flying machines and organ transplants. Meanwhile, the adventurism that marked economic management, including immiseration through demonetisation, has been ‘managed’ through loyal social and corporate media. Intellectual toadyism and crony capitalism have overtaken New Delhi on a subcontinental scale, but sooner than later this drift towards regimented society and whispered dissent must be reversed. Too much is at stake for too many citizens — India must revert to the true, messy and contested democracy we have known and appreciated. Parliamentary democracy is the governance procedure adopted by each and every country of South Asia, and the Indian practice has always been held up as the example. The precedents set by India’s courts are studied elsewhere, the professionalism of the civil service is regarded as the benchmark, and everyone else seeks the aspirational welfare state set in motion in India in the middle of the 20th century. This is why we watch worried as Indian democracy weakens in step with its economy, as inter-community relationships within India descend to one-sided animus, and as New Delhi’s global clout decreases in inverse proportion to Beijing’s. To cover weaknesses in governance and promises undelivered, Mr.Modi as the solo electoral face of the BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP) has whipped up a tornado of militarised nationalism that projects Pakistan as the exclusive enemy. No one dares remind the Indian voters that Pakistan is the far weaker power; its people are battling fanatical demons more than are Indian citizens; Pakistan is a large potential market for India’s goods and services; and the future of Kashmir must be based on Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Meanwhile, Lahore intellectuals watch with apprehension as India copies the excesses of Pakistan’s theocratic state. Dhaka observers are numbed into silence with New Delhi’s vigorous backing of Prime Minister Sheikh HasinaWajed as she constructs an intolerant one-party regime. Colombo rides a geopolitical see-saw as New Delhi shadow-boxes Beijing. And Kathmandu wonders whether New Delhi has it in itself to concede that the amplified Chinese involvement in Nepal is the result of the Great Blockade of 2015-16. India has been reduced to a giant nervously finger-counting friends made or lost to China. The media triumphalism that greets even modest shifts in India’s favour — be it in Male or Thimphu — marks unnecessarily low self-esteem. New Delhi seems preoccupied with ‘managing’ South Asian countries when it should be commanding the global platforms on climate alteration, protection of pluralism and correcting imbalances in global wealth. Few note the incongruity of a New Delhi loudly daring Islamabad while acting coy on Beijing, which one would have thought was the real adversary or competitor. Meanwhile India’s celebrated soft power wilts even as the Chinese work to wipe out their English deficit, and Beijing places Confucius Institutes in far corners. Chinese goods flood the Indian market, Chinese research and development gallops ahead of India’s, and Beijing convincingly moves to tackle environmental degradation. India seems drowsy and lethargic in contrast. South Asia as a whole — much of it the historical ‘India’ — roots for Indian democracy even while welcoming Chinese investment, infrastructure loans and tourists. Also because it has the largest population in the Subcontinent, India is expected to lead South Asia on myriad issues including the death-dealing Indo-Gangetic smog, fertilizer and pesticide use, cross-border vectors, arsenic poisoning, regional commerce and economic rationalisation, social inclusion and the Human Development Index and so on. But leadership requires humility, to study, for example, how adjacent societies have successfully tackled great challenges — look at Bangladesh surging towards middle income country status. Nepal has long been regarded by exasperated New Delhi policy-makers as the South Asian basket case sending out migrant labour to India. This much is true, but it also emerges that the Nepal economy is the seventh largest sender of remittance to India after the UAE, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the U.K., Bangladesh and Canada. Unlike these others, Nepal’s remittances go to India’s poorest parts, in Bihar, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. We switch on India’s news channels and find an abysmal common denominator in terms of civility and rationality. The national intelligentsia seems intimidated, unable to challenge the rigid, dangerously populist narrative of the BJP/RashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh (RSS). We watch as the National Register of Citizens propels statelessness, as the refoulement of Rohingyarefugees points to a reckless disregard for fundamental humanitarian principles, and as majoritarianism weakens the pillar of representative democracy that is the protection of minorities. India is indeed large and important, but the chest size of a country does not translate into equity, social justice or international standing. Because nearly 20% of humanity lives within its boundaries, when India falters, the pit of despair and the potential for violence open up wide and deep. The South Asia that New Delhi’s policy and opinion-makers should consider is not the centralised Jambudvipa mega-state of the RSS imagination. Instead, the ideal South Asian regionalism is all about limiting the power of the national capitals, devolving power to federal units and strengthening local democracy. Modi’s own idea of regionalism is one where he calls the shots. The start of his current term was marked by an attempt to dictate to the neighbours, after which the pendulum swung to the other extreme. The freeze put by India on the inter-governmental South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is only a cynical means to keep Pakistan out of the club. The sabotaging of SAARC can hardly be considered a victory, for that feather-light geopolitical stratagem fails to consider that regionalism is a potent means to bring economic growth and social justice to India’s own poverty-stricken ‘peripheral regions’ from Assam to Purvanchal to Rajasthan. For its own security and prosperity as well as that of the rest of us, India must re-connect with South Asia. Sub continental regionalism is also important to achieve New Delhi’s ambitions on the world stage, including that coveted seat at the UN Security Council. India’s global comeback will start the day New Delhi think tanks begin questioning South and North Block rather than serving as purveyors of spin. On South Asian matters, they should pull out a copy of the Gujral Doctrine from the archives, to be dusted and re-examined.

India cannot threaten Pakistan—it’s conventional forces are too weak and Pakistan nuclear escalation checks

Kevin R. James is an economist in the Systemic Risk Centre at the London School of Economics, 4-18, 19, //www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-pakistan-making-the-stability-instability-paradox-go-one-way/ India and Pakistan: making the stability/instability paradox go one way In the case of Kashmir, however, Pakistan has cleverly combined its conventional and nuclear capabilities in a way that makes it impossible for India to impose such a penalty at a price that India is willing to pay. That’s because Pakistan’s conventional strength is sufficient to eliminate India’s ability to impose significant costs with a low-intensity conventional response, and Pakistan has drawn its nuclear use red lines such that any high-intensity conventional response will lead to the risk of a nuclear war. In short, Pakistan has found a way to make the stability/instability paradox go one way… Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy leaves India with two unpalatable options: live with the insurgency and terrorism that Pakistan promotes; or retaliate in a manner that crosses Pakistan’s nuclear red lines (as currently defined).. A realistic evaluation of India’s response to the 14 February suicide bombing that triggered the current crisis shows that India has simply not been able to impose such a cost. The response consisted of border clashes and a small number of airstrikes. But Pakistan’s forces along the border have easily been able to match the low-intensity Indian initiatives such as limited artillery barrages, and so these tit-for-tat exchanges haven’t led to any Indian advantage. And while the Indian Air Force has been a bit more aggressive, it’s clear that the Pakistan Air Force is more than capable of dealing with low-intensity Indian air operations. India does have the capability to mount a high-intensity conventional response that would enable it to impose substantial costs on Pakistan. For example, India could mobilise its more powerful land forces and destroy a significant proportion of the Pakistani army; use its more powerful air force to achieve air superiority over Pakistan and mount a sustained campaign on the jihadist infrastructure; and/or use its more powerful navy to put in place a blockade that would have devastating consequences for the Pakistani economy. However, each of these high-intensity actions (or anything similar) would cross one of Pakistan’s red lines and so trigger a risk of a nuclear response. Due to the current state of the India–Pakistan nuclear balance, India is unwilling to run that risk. Consequently, it has no effective response to Pakistan’s aggression in Kashmir.

Non-unique – Pakistan will continue to support the insurgency

Kevin R. James is an economist in the Systemic Risk Centre at the London School of Economics, 4-18, 19, //www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-pakistan-making-the-stability-instability-paradox-go-one-way/ India and Pakistan: making the stability/instability paradox go one way Kashmir is a quagmire for India because Pakistan can intervene in ways that keep the conflict going essentially for free. Pakistan’s civilian and military/security institutions are as one in supporting the insurgency in Kashmir, and the combination of the transnational jihadist network and the Kashmiri independence movement ensures that there’s no shortage of insurgents to support. That support doesn’t require any significant economic investment on Pakistan’s part, and the death and destruction that the insurgency produces don’t fall on groups that create political costs in Pakistan. So, Pakistan will continue its ideological and material support for the Kashmiri insurgency (to India’s considerable detriment) unless India can devise some way to impose a significant cost on Pakistan for doing so.

India has a massive military advantage backed by nuclear weapons

Kevin R. James is an economist in the Systemic Risk Centre at the London School of Economics, 4-18, 19, //www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-pakistan-making-the-stability-instability-paradox-go-one-way/ India and Pakistan: making the stability/instability paradox go one way To change the game that India is otherwise destined to lose, India must find a way to limit Pakistan’s nuclear threat. The way to limit this threat is to achieve nuclear superiority (which may not require an explicit change to Indian nuclear strategy). India is now striving to do just that. Nuclear superiority will, somewhat paradoxically, enable India to exploit its massive conventional military superiority over Pakistan. If India has nuclear superiority, Pakistan will be far less willing to risk a nuclear exchange with India. Pakistan will then redraw its red lines in a much more conservative way.

India Security Council membership needed to establish Indian global leadership, challenge China, promote global democracy, and lead on climate change

Dixit, 4-16, 19, Kanak Mani Dixit, a writer and journalist based in Kathmandu, is the founding editor of the Colombo-based magazine, ‘Himal Southasian’, Kanak Mani Dixit, a writer and journalist based in Kathmandu, is the founding editor of the Colombo-based magazine, ‘Himal Southasian’ Indian elections, South Asian concerns, //www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/indian-elections-south-asian-concerns/article26858338.ece The rest of South Asia wants the very best of democracy for India, plus to share in the peace dividend, growth and camaraderie The staggering scale of the election that is under way in India with just under a billion voters is hard for the mind to grapple with, even in this densely populated neighbourhood that includes Bangladesh and Pakistan. The level of worry is also at a pitch, for India should be the bulwark against weakening democracy in a world of Bolsonaro (Brazil), Duterte (the Philippines), Erdoğan (Turkey), Putin (Russia) and Trump (the U.S.) not to mention the People’s Republic of China. Redefining India Modern India, created by M.K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru and their cohort, should be raising the standard for social justice and grass-roots democracy, and against destructive right-wing populism. This has not quite been Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s record, and hence the concern that another five years would redefine the very idea of India. Already, the term ‘world’s largest democracy’ is achieving banality as India gains majoritarian momentum. Centralised control of society would never be possible in such a vast and variegated society of sub-nationalities, we were told, but look at what is happening. The high principle and probity of India’s political class, bureaucracy, academia and civil society are now exceptions rather than the rule. India’s Ambassadors are no longer the self-confident professionals we knew for decades, they act today like timid note-takers. Higher education is directed by those who insist that the achievements of Vedic era science included flying machines and organ transplants. Meanwhile, the adventurism that marked economic management, including immiseration through demonetisation, has been ‘managed’ through loyal social and corporate media. VDO.AIVDO.AI Intellectual toadyism and crony capitalism have overtaken New Delhi on a subcontinental scale, but sooner than later this drift towards regimented society and whispered dissent must be reversed. Too much is at stake for too many citizens — India must revert to the true, messy and contested democracy we have known and appreciated. Soft power Parliamentary democracy is the governance procedure adopted by each and every country of South Asia, and the Indian practice has always been held up as the example. The precedents set by India’s courts are studied elsewhere, the professionalism of the civil service is regarded as the benchmark, and everyone else seeks the aspirational welfare state set in motion in India in the middle of the 20th century. This is why we watch worried as Indian democracy weakens in step with its economy, as inter-community relationships within India descend to one-sided animus, and as New Delhi’s global clout decreases in inverse proportion to Beijing’s. To cover weaknesses in governance and promises undelivered, Mr. Modi as the solo electoral face of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has whipped up a tornado of militarised nationalism that projects Pakistan as the exclusive enemy. No one dares remind the Indian voters that Pakistan is the far weaker power; its people are battling fanatical demons more than are Indian citizens; Pakistan is a large potential market for India’s goods and services; and the future of Kashmir must be based on Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Meanwhile, Lahore intellectuals watch with apprehension as India copies the excesses of Pakistan’s theocratic state. Dhaka observers are numbed into silence with New Delhi’s vigorous backing of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed as she constructs an intolerant one-party regime. Colombo rides a geopolitical see-saw as New Delhi shadow-boxes Beijing. And Kathmandu wonders whether New Delhi has it in itself to concede that the amplified Chinese involvement in Nepal is the result of the Great Blockade of 2015-16. Coy on Beijing India has been reduced to a giant nervously finger-counting friends made or lost to China. The media triumphalism that greets even modest shifts in India’s favour — be it in Male or Thimphu — marks unnecessarily low self-esteem. New Delhi seems preoccupied with ‘managing’ South Asian countries when it should be commanding the global platforms on climate alteration, protection of pluralism and correcting imbalances in global wealth. Few note the incongruity of a New Delhi loudly daring Islamabad while acting coy on Beijing, which one would have thought was the real adversary or competitor. Meanwhile India’s celebrated soft power wilts even as the Chinese work to wipe out their English deficit, and Beijing places Confucius Institutes in far corners. Chinese goods flood the Indian market, Chinese research and development gallops ahead of India’s, and Beijing convincingly moves to tackle environmental degradation. India seems drowsy and lethargic in contrast. South Asia as a whole — much of it the historical ‘India’ — roots for Indian democracy even while welcoming Chinese investment, infrastructure loans and tourists. Also because it has the largest population in the Subcontinent, India is expected to lead South Asia on myriad issues including the death-dealing Indo-Gangetic smog, fertilizer and pesticide use, cross-border vectors, arsenic poisoning, regional commerce and economic rationalisation, social inclusion and the Human Development Index and so on. But leadership requires humility, to study, for example, how adjacent societies have successfully tackled great challenges — look at Bangladesh surging towards middle income country status. Nepal has long been regarded by exasperated New Delhi policy-makers as the South Asian basket case sending out migrant labour to India. This much is true, but it also emerges that the Nepal economy is the seventh largest sender of remittance to India after the UAE, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the U.K., Bangladesh and Canada. Unlike these others, Nepal’s remittances go to India’s poorest parts, in Bihar, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. We switch on India’s news channels and find an abysmal common denominator in terms of civility and rationality. The national intelligentsia seems intimidated, unable to challenge the rigid, dangerously populist narrative of the BJP/Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). We watch as the National Register of Citizens propels statelessness, as the refoulement of Rohingya refugees points to a reckless disregard for fundamental humanitarian principles, and as majoritarianism weakens the pillar of representative democracy that is the protection of minorities. Regionalism’s import India is indeed large and important, but the chest size of a country does not translate into equity, social justice or international standing. Because nearly 20% of humanity lives within its boundaries, when India falters, the pit of despair and the potential for violence open up wide and deep. The South Asia that New Delhi’s policy and opinion-makers should consider is not the centralised Jambudvipa mega-state of the RSS imagination. Instead, the ideal South Asian regionalism is all about limiting the power of the national capitals, devolving power to federal units and strengthening local democracy. Mr. Modi’s own idea of regionalism is one where he calls the shots. The start of his current term was marked by an attempt to dictate to the neighbours, after which the pendulum swung to the other extreme. The freeze put by India on the inter-governmental South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is only a cynical means to keep Pakistan out of the club. The sabotaging of SAARC can hardly be considered a victory, for that feather-light geopolitical stratagem fails to consider that regionalism is a potent means to bring economic growth and social justice to India’s own poverty-stricken ‘peripheral regions’ from Assam to Purvanchal to Rajasthan. For its own security and prosperity as well as that of the rest of us, India must re-connect with South Asia. Subcontinental regionalism is also important to achieve New Delhi’s ambitions on the world stage, including that coveted seat at the UN Security Council. India’s global comeback will start the day New Delhi think tanks begin questioning South and North Block rather than serving as purveyors of spin. On South Asian matters, they should pull out a copy of the Gujral Doctrine from the archives, to be dusted and re-examined. We seek an India that is prosperous and advancing at double digit growth, not only because what this would mean for its 1.35 billion citizens, but to the other 500 million South Asians. For its own selfish interests, the rest of South Asia wants India to succeed in the world. Kanak Mani Dixit, a writer and journalist based in Kathmandu, is the founding editor of the Colombo-based magazine, ‘Himal Southasian’

Put away the potato chips — If there is a nuclear war, it will be between India and Pakistan, and it will kill 2 billion people

John Feffer is the director of Foreign Policy In Focus and the author of the dystopian novel Splinterlands, March 13, 2019, The World’s Most Dangerous Divide, //fpif.org/the-worlds-most-dangerous-divide/ If nuclear war comes, it will happen because of a calculation or miscalculation by India or Pakistan. By John Feffer, March 13, 2019. Print Friendly, PDF & EmailPrint hindu-nationalists-india-pakistan-sectarian Hindu nationalists rally in Calcutta (Shutterstock) In the beautiful and terrifying novel The City of Devi, communal hatreds escalate in India and Pakistan until the two countries feel compelled to threaten each other with nuclear weapons. At least, it starts out as a threat. Pakistan vows to take out Mumbai, and India will level Karachi. But everyone involved knows that nuclear war doesn’t really work that way. “Nuclear bombs are like potato chips,” the author Manil Suri writes, “nobody can stop at just one. Every scenario predicts that a country under attack will launch all its weapons at once to avoid losing them.” The populations of the two cities panic. A great exodus takes place as residents flee by car, by train, even by foot, and the wealthy try to snag the last berths on the outgoing ships. A woman and a man traverse this chaos in search of the object of their affections: it’s love in the soon-to-be-ruins. They hope against hope that the bombs won’t fall. And then an accident happens, as they so often do, and Pakistan mistakenly launches one missile at Mumbai. And India retaliates with four strikes on Karachi. One of the characters in the novel, Mr. Cheerio, assesses the damage from some faraway perch via short-wave radio: You might think me cold-blooded, but this is one of the best possible outcomes in terms of human cost. Only one or two cities struck, and that too almost empty — can you imagine the miniscule probability? There was bound to be an exchange, either now or in the future — things had gone too far. Every war-game simulation I’ve ever seen predicted results more final, more unthinkable, than how this seems to have played out. Manil Suri is a mathematician, as well as a novelist, so he knows about probabilities. The devastation wrought by the nuclear exchange in The City of Devi is terrible — the incineration, the radiation, the environmental damage. But a roll of the nuclear dice could have produced much worse. Those worse-case scenarios are what India and Pakistan — and the rest of the world — have been recently contemplating. After all, the most likely locus of nuclear war is not on the Korean peninsula. It’s not across the old Cold War divide in Europe. It won’t involve Israel’s secret cache of H-bombs. If nuclear war comes, it will happen because of a calculation or miscalculation by India or Pakistan. There are fanatics on both sides who care only about vanquishing their rival by any means necessary. Unlike in a novel, however, a catastrophic denouement to the current conflict is not inevitable. Tit for Tat India and Pakistan have been engaged in a tug-of-war over the territory of Kashmir since the very separation of the two countries that followed independence in 1947. China, too, has gone to war with India over its portion of the territory. Kashmir is the only place in the world where three nuclear powers have a border dispute. In the most conflict-ridden part of the region, the Jammu and Kashmir region of northern India, a separatist movement inspired by Islamic radicalism squares off against about a half a million Indian troops. Three wars between India and Pakistan, plus the skirmishes that have taken place in between, have claimed around 70,000 lives. Last month, as part of the insurgency against Indian control of this part of Kashmir, a suicide bomber went after a unit of Indian soldiers, killing 40. In response, India launched its first cross-border attack on Pakistan in nearly 50 years when it bombed a presumed militant encampment. Pakistan responded by dropping some bombs inside Indian territory. Neither attack seems to have destroyed much of anything, though India claims otherwise. In a subsequent dogfight, Pakistan shot down an Indian jet fighter and captured the pilot. In a hopeful move, Pakistan returned the pilot to India “as a gesture of peace.” However, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reciprocated with a threat: the first attacks were just practice, he warned, “now we have to make it real.” A new round of attacks, however, was not forthcoming. Pakistan has promised to go after Islamic militancy and has even taken some steps in that direction. As The Economist put it, “Relations between India and Pakistan are returning to the normal huffy disdain after a week of military brinkmanship.” It’s a mistake, however, to think that all is well on the subcontinent. Future Sparks The political party of Narendra Modi subscribes to a virulent version of Hindu nationalism. He largely soft-peddled this nationalism four years ago when the BJP won a commanding parliamentary majority. Once in power, however, Modi has fallen back on what worked for him as the chief minister of Gujarat: inflaming the passions of his more militant followers. Writes Max Frost in The National Interest: Indian politicians have normalized hardline Hindu nationalism through draconian cow protection laws, the renaming of cities with Muslim names, and the appointment of extremist Hindu nationalists to powerful positions. These shifting priorities explain Modi’s 2017 appointment of a firebrand Hindu monk, Yogi Adityanath, as chief minister of India’s most populous state. Adityanath has claimed that Hindus are “preparing for religious war” and has called Muslims “a crop of two-legged animals that has to be stopped.” Hindu nationalists have also taken aim at the Indian constitution, which provides Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir province the special status of greater autonomy. So, for instance, Indian citizens from other parts of the country can’t buy property in the province, which helps it retain its Muslim majority. Top BJP officials, however, want Article 370, the offending part of the constitution, repealed. Indian elections take place next month, and Modi is campaigning for a second term. Because of the myriad problems facing the country, he was looking at a significant backlash at the polls. The aggressive response to Pakistan, however, has boosted his electoral fortunes. According to political analyst Yogendra Yadav, Modi’s party could have lost at least 100 seats in the upcoming election, but now, “the impression is things have improved for BJP.” Pakistan has promised to go after suspected militants on its territory. But Prime Minister Imran Khan is in a difficult position. The country is practically bankrupt, and he has had to go begging to Saudi Arabia in particular for assistance. He has also taken a more accommodationist approach to the Taliban as a way to resolve the war in Afghanistan and reduce cross-border problems. The Trump administration, meanwhile, has not shown Pakistan much love. China has much better relations with Islamabad, but has been quite selective in pressuring its ally to crack down on extremism. China views some extremist factions, for instance, as useful for cementing Beijing’s influence in Afghanistan and hobbling its major challenger in the region, namely India. As The New York Times notes, the Trump administration is in no position to act as a mediator, given the president’s obvious preference for India, “where he has pursued business interests.” Indeed, the subcontinent has emerged as a locus of U.S.-China conflict, as Beijing has pushed forward with its Belt and Road initiative in Pakistan and the United States is pressuring India to join its containment strategy against Iran. India and Pakistan may well shape up to be the modern counterpart to Cold-War-divided Germany. Kashmir, then, is the new Berlin: divided, tense, full of intrigue. The two superpowers have found two very dangerous proxies to engage in shadow play. The military confrontation, meanwhile, has developed its own dynamic. As Arzan Tarapore writes at War on the Rocks: India demonstrated a new appetite for imposing costs on Pakistan, and especially for crossing thresholds and accepting risk. Its actions probably still won’t deter Pakistan, though they will make the next crisis more dangerous. India may now assess that henceforth it can strike its neighbor, absorb a proportionate Pakistani retaliation, and safely de-escalate later in a crisis. But with Pakistan now more concerned about its own deterrent, this crisis may induce both sides to take riskier action next time. Such riskier actions could escalate all the way to the nuclear level. And the consequences of a nuclear exchange would be considerably worse than what’s depicted in The City of Devi. If the two sides only use only a portion of their nuclear arsenals, it would kill millions of people on the subcontinent and also have a devastating impact worldwide. A partial nuclear winter would settle upon the planet: the resulting hunger, drought, and disease would kill as many as 2 billion people. Now that the acute crisis has passed, regional actors have to use this reprieve to defuse the world’s most dangerous nuclear faultline. Those efforts have to begin with Kashmir. Fortunately, the difficult task of working out a joint resolution to the problem has already been done, back in the mid-2000s. As Ahmed Rashid points out: Indian and Pakistani envoys agreed to make the Line of Control, the heavily militarized border between the Indian and Pakistani-controlled portions of Kashmir, irrelevant by giving the Kashmiris the right to free movement and trade across the line. They agreed upon providing autonomy to Kashmir’s subregions and drawing down forces as violence receded. They also agreed to establish a body of Kashmiris, Indians, and Pakistanis, vaguely described as a “joint mechanism,” to oversee the political and economic rights of the Kashmiris on both sides of the line. Khan seems amenable to revisiting this deal; Modi will not budge until after the elections. The missing ingredient at this point is pressure from outside the subcontinent. Here, the cluelessness of the Trump administration and the unraveling U.S.-China relationship serve as significant obstacles. But maybe India and Pakistan will show more sense than their respective backers. These are ancient civilizations that have weathered many previous storms. Now they just have to team up to avoid a nuclear winter.

India already supporting all female peacekeeping, including on the Congo

Press Trust of India, 4-12, 19, //www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/un-must-encourage-members-to-deploy-all-female-peacekeeping-units-india/story-up1NZ8KH63g851kkyxiZsK.htm UN must encourage members to deploy all-female peacekeeping units: Indial Gambhir said India is fully prepared to deploy a Female Engagement Team (FET) comprising 22 women officers and soldiers as part of rapidly deployable battalion in Congo by August. It will also deploy a women Formed Police Unit (FPU) in South Sudan by this year-end. India partnered UN Women towards capacity building initiatives at the New Delhi-based Centre for UN Peacekeeping, which conducted the third UN female military officers course for 40 women military officers from 26 countries. India also provided adequate pre-deployment training on gender sensitization to its peacekeeping forces.

China currently backs Pakistan in the Security Council to maintain relations and protect China’s international leadership and its China-Pakistan corridor

Adnan Aamir is a journalist and researcher based in Pakistan. He has written extensively on the Belt and Road Initiative for Nikkei Asian Review, Financial Times, South China Morning Post, Lowy Institute, CSIS and Asia Times, among others. He was a Chevening South Asian Journalism Fellow 2018 at the University of Westminster, London.April 9, 2019, //jamestown.org/program/chinas-diplomatic-moves-amidst-the-india-pakistan-conflict/ China’s Diplomatic Moves Amidst the India-Pakistan Conflict Pakistan has been a strategic partner of China since 1962. During the last 57 years regimes have changed along with international politics, but Pakistan’s relations with China have remained close. China helped Pakistan during its wars with India, against the Soviet Union in the Afghan War, and also with the development of Pakistan’s nuclear program (Times of India, January 28, 2017). Likewise, China has consistently stood with Pakistan in the UN Security Council. Over the years, India has lobbied for multiple UNSC resolutions against Pakistan-based groups that India claims are involved in terrorism. However, as a permanent member of the UNSC, China has used its veto power generously to provide diplomatic cover for Pakistan. If the UNSC designates Azhar, or others like him, as terrorists then it will not only damage the international standing of Pakistan, but also potentially generate problems for Pakistan internally. 2) Countering the Rise of India China attempts to indirectly counter India by supporting its arch-nemesis Pakistan. India stands as a major impediment to China’s goals to become the undisputed leader of Asia. Although the size of the Indian economy is nowhere near that of China, India is projected to overtake China as the world’s most populous country by the year 2024 (Times of India, June 21, 2017), and its military power presents a potential challenge to the PRC in South Asia. In addition to that, India has also given refuge to the Dalai Lama since 1959, and is home to the Tibetan government-in-exile. Therefore, China is apprehensive of India’s rise and perceives it as a threat not only to its own aspirations of global dominance, but also for the security of Tibet (China Daily, April 5, 2017). India is constantly facing the menace of terrorism: terrorists have attacked the Indian parliament, its financial hub Mumbai, and launched countless attacks in Kashmir. These attacks not only affect the growth of the Indian economy, but also prevent it from attaining the status of a fully secure country (India Today, October 6, 2015). India wants to get rid of its terrorism problem, and it believes that the only way to do so is to confront Pakistan. Each and every time India blames Pakistan for acts of terrorism, China provides diplomatic cover to Pakistan in the UN Security Council—therefore, the PRC is effectively aiding terrorist groups that target India [1]. Despite this, Beijing still does not want to confront India directly. It not only engages in trade with India at levels much higher than Pakistan, but also continues to reach out to India through diplomatic connections. Therefore, right after blocking the resolution against Azhar, China expressed its desire for diplomatic dialogue with India (South China Morning Post, March 16). Such steps are intended to help the PRC manage India’s reactions to the moves made by China against India’s interests, especially in the UNSC. India already blocks 3) Retaining the Support of Pakistan for the CPEC The third reason that motivated China to block the resolution against Azhar was its ongoing effort to retain the whole-hearted support of Pakistan for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), an ambitious $62 billion infrastructure program the PRC has pledged for Pakistan’s economy (China Brief, 05 January; China Brief, February 15). The former Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government of PM Nawaz Sharif signed the CPEC agreements with China; however, ever since assuming office in 2018, the incumbent Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party-led government of Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan has expressed reluctance to carry forward with CPEC. Razak Dawood, a PTI cabinet member, has demanded that CPEC projects should be postponed for one year, and reviewed to ensure that they consistent with the interests of Pakistan (Pakistan Today, September 30, 2018). Even the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, has said that Pakistan will ask China to review the CPEC agreements. This change in policy angered Beijing, which refused to assist Pakistan last year when the country desperately needed a bailout to support its troubled economy (Dawn, November 3, 2018). Pakistan sought help from Saudi Arabia and the UAE instead to prevent a foreign exchange default. Following this squabble in autumn 2018, relations have mended in 2019, and Pakistan is currently making a renewed push for progress in CPEC. Pakistan has allocated additional funds to develop CPEC infrastructure projects in the southern province of Balochistan (Express Tribune, March 22, 2019)—a region that has recently seen threats to Chinese citizens and PRC infrastructure projects from separatist insurgents (China Brief, 15 February). PM Imran Khan has also agreed to attend the Second Belt and Road Forum scheduled to be held in Beijing later this month. 4) Purchasing Security for PRC Interests in South Asia There is an additional security dimension to the PRC’s diplomatic protection for Masood Azhar and JeM: China relies in part on Pakistan to secure its southwestern border region. With the help of Pakistan, China has cracked down on the Uighur militants who were operating under the umbrella of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (Dawn, September 2, 2015). Therefore, the PRC wants to retain a strategic relationship with Pakistan to secure its borders—especially at a time when Beijing has cracked down on Uighur citizens en masse in Xinjiang. Furthermore, CPEC roads pass near Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which is the operating area for Jaish-e-Muhammad. If the PRC had supported sanctions against Azhar, there was a fear that JeM might have attacked Chinese interests in Pakistan. In that context, experts believe that China’s moves in the UNSC have a two-fold benefit: (1) they deflect the possibility of JeM directing attacks against Chinese interests and citizens based in Pakistan; and (2) they smartly mute any possible criticism by Islamic groups in Pakistan of Beijing’s mass internment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. [2]